Policy Issues Series: Public Safety

Written By Pray March Act

By George Sarkissian, Director of Policy & Civic Engagement

As election season heats up in New York City, we’re digging into the issues that feel important to the city and keep coming up on the campaign trail. Our PMA newsletters will include a three-part series on policy issues currently impacting the city. While the candidates offer a range of approaches, we’ll explore the case for policy reforms and identify examples of best practices from other cities, in an attempt to contextualize the policy solutions currently being offered by the candidates. We’ll explore three policy areas: child care, housing, and public safety. As Christians, we’re called to “seek the welfare of the city” (Jeremiah 29), and understanding the policies that seek to help our neighbors and communities requires our time, energy, and thoughtfulness. We invite you to dig into these policy issues with us, so that, as followers of Jesus, we can consider them as we vote in the upcoming election.

I. The Historical Context and Current Public Safety Data in NYC

The City’s journey toward reduced crime is a significant national achievement. The peak era of criminal activity occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, catalyzed by socioeconomic factors including the crack cocaine epidemic.1 In 1980, the homicide rate stood at 25.8 per 100,000 residents.2 Following strategic interventions and broader societal shifts 1, crime declined continuously throughout the 2000s.1 By 2023, the homicide rate had fallen dramatically to 4.1 per 100,000 residents, comparing favorably to the U.S. national average of 5.6.1

While NYC achieved major long-term reductions through 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic represented a rupture, causing violence to spike and perceived public disorder to spread rapidly. Examining the shift from the pre-pandemic baseline reveals that major felonies are currently operating at levels significantly higher than 2019. Comparing the first six months of 2019 to the first six months of 2025, five key felony offenses—many directly contributing to public disorder and fear—saw a combined increase of 30.8%. Specifically, Felony Assault, a key driver of public fear, rose by 43.8%, and Grand Larceny of Motor Vehicle (auto theft) surged by 199.0%. This data establishes the magnitude of the post-pandemic spike in crime above the historical low baseline.

Table 1: NYC Select Major Felony Crime Changes (Pre- vs. Post-Pandemic Jan-Jun)

In response to the elevated crime levels seen in the post-pandemic years, recent strategies have led to measurable success. Comparing the most recent Year-to-Date (YTD) crime data for 2025 against the 2024 baseline demonstrates a clear downward trend in overall felony crime, affirming that while rates are high compared to 2019, the city is successfully driving crime back down from its recent peak. Total Seven Major Felonies declined by 3.61%, driven by a significant 15.8% drop in Murder and a nearly 10% drop in Robbery (though with an unfortunate 19.2% increase in Rape).

Table 2: NYC Seven Major Felony Offenses (Recent Trend: 2024 YTD vs. 2025 YTD)

Despite these objective safety gains, public fear is elevated, demonstrating a significant decoupling of objective safety metrics and subjective anxiety. In a recent analysis, 54% of New Yorkers reported feeling less safe on public transit, a concern often fueled by highly visible, high-profile crimes and pervasive disorder.3 This widespread discomfort is exacerbated by the visible surge in chronic homelessness (131,940 individuals reported in 2024) and mental health crises visible in public spaces.3 

II. The Efficacy and Equity Crisis of Traditional Policing

The traditional political response to high crime often involves increasing uniformed police headcount. However, expert analysis of historical data concludes that increased NYPD headcount is not a direct solution to crime reduction; rather, "more money or more officers does not automatically make New Yorkers safer."12 This research indicates that simple, raw increases in officer numbers do not correlate proportionally with decreases in crime.12 Instead, long-term effectiveness is rooted in "targeted deployment coupled with services," shifting away from indiscriminate surges in uniformed presence.12

Historical reliance on aggressive proactive tactics, particularly the stop-and-frisk policy, provides a critical case study in the systemic costs of over-policing and the resulting erosion of civil liberties in low-income communities. The has NYPD conducted millions of stops, reaching a peak of 685,724 stops in 2011.13 This mass enforcement effort disproportionately targeted minority communities and proved overwhelmingly ineffective as a crime reduction tool:

  • Racial Disparity: In 2024, 91% of stops involved Black (60%) or Latinx (31%) individuals, compared to only 6% involving white individuals.13

  • Innocence Rate: Between 2003 and 2013, nearly 90% of all stops targeted innocent individuals, failing to result in a summons or arrest.13 Even in 2024, 69% of stops were innocent.13

The conclusion is definitive: there is "no evidence that ramping up stops makes New Yorkers safer".13 Instead, these millions of stops resulted in unlawful encounters, severe erosion of community trust, and a violation of the civil liberties of a massive number of innocent people of color.13

III. Public Health Pivot & Comparative City Models

A. New York City: B-HEARD

To address the non-criminal crises driving public disorder, NYC launched the Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division (B-HEARD) in 2021, shifting the response for non-violent/non-weapon mental health calls to a health-centered model.6 B-HEARD teams consist of two FDNY EMTs/paramedics and a mental health professional from NYC Health + Hospitals.7

When successfully deployed, B-HEARD is clinically effective. The core goals are to reduce unnecessary use of police resources, increase community-based care connection, and reduce unnecessary hospital transports.14 B-HEARD has demonstrated high public acceptance: 92% of individuals accepted assistance, which is notably higher than the 87% acceptance rate for traditional NYPD/EMS responses.15 This outcome is consistent with national findings that Mobile Crisis Teams (MCTs) are more favorably perceived than law enforcement responses and successfully decrease emergency department utilization and psychiatric hospitalization.16

Despite the clear clinical validation of the model, B-HEARD is severely limited by operational capacity and deficient triage protocols. Currently, B-HEARD operates only 16 hours a day (6 a.m. to 10 p.m.) in 31 precincts across four boroughs.7 This structure excludes critical overnight hours (1 a.m. to 9 a.m.), during which 14,200 eligible calls failed to receive a B-HEARD response.17 Furthermore, a recent audit revealed systemic dispatch failures: out of 37,113 calls assessed as eligible between Fiscal Years 2022 and 2024, 13,042 (35%) failed to receive B-HEARD services for untracked reasons.17

B. Denver, Colorado: Support Team Assisted Response (STAR)

Denver’s Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) program, deploying a clinician and a medic 9, has responded to over 8,000 calls since June 2020.9 A rigorous study demonstrated that dispatching these mental health workers led to a 34% fall in reports of less-serious crimes in STAR-patrolled neighborhoods compared to precincts without the service.18 This reduction is not merely a consequence of diversion, but a direct outcome of crime prevention, achieved by referring 41% of individuals served to formal mental health or substance use treatment and connecting 38% to community resources.9 This success confirms that alternative response is an active public health intervention that reduces future criminal activity by addressing root causes.18

C. Los Angeles, California: Unarmed Model of Crisis Response (UMCR)/CIRCLE

Los Angeles has successfully implemented a large-scale, 24/7 unarmed response model, the Unarmed Model of Crisis Response (UMCR), also known as CIRCLE.19 UMCR/CIRCLE teams respond to high-visibility, non-violent issues like mental health crises, substance abuse, and indecent exposure.19 In its first year (March 2024–March 2025), UMCR completed 9,325 calls for service.10 The program validates the safety of the unarmed approach in a dense urban environment: only 3.7% of these calls required subsequent intervention by the Los Angeles Police Department.10 This minimal police involvement rate proves that a scaled, dedicated, public health-led response can effectively and safely manage high-volume crisis calls.

D. Eugene, Oregon: CAHOOTS

The Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets (CAHOOTS) program, established in 1989, utilizes a Mental Health Worker and a Medic.8 CAHOOTS demonstrates high effectiveness in diverting workload, resolving approximately 20% of all calls through the city's public safety communications center.8 Importantly, the risk profile is minimal: out of an estimated 24,000 calls responded to in 2019, only 311 required police backup, equating to approximately 1.3%.8 This history of success demonstrates that unarmed civilian teams can safely handle substantial non-violent crisis call volume, allowing police to focus on crime-related matters.8

IV. Conclusion and Policy Mandates for Integrated Public Safety Reform

The evidence suggests NYC should consider restructuring its public safety infrastructure. The era of relying on police expansion and high-volume, racially disparate enforcement tactics, which demonstrably fail to improve safety 13, should end. As we evaluate the public safety plans of the candidates for mayor in the upcoming election, this analysis concludes that the City's focus should potentially shift to leveraging the proven efficacy of public health interventions to address the root causes of disorder and fear. 

Works cited

  1. Crime in New York City - Wikipedia, accessed October 17, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_in_New_York_City

  2. Homicide Analysis - New York City, 1980 - Office of Justice Programs, accessed October 17, 2025, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/homicide-analysis-new-york-city-1980

  3. Scott Stringer's Vision for Public Safety and Quality of Life, accessed October 17, 2025, https://scottstringernyc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Stringer-Public-Safety-and-Homelessness-Plan-MC25-11.pdf

  4. Neighborhood Crime and Perception of Safety as Predictors of Victimization and Offending Among Youth: A Call for Macro-Level Prevention and Intervention Models, accessed October 17, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3462468/

  5. Practices in Modern Policing: Highlighting Contemporary ..., accessed October 17, 2025, https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/practices-in-modern-policing/

  6. B-HEARD 911 Mental Health Response - Mayor's Office of Community Mental Health, accessed October 17, 2025, https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard

  7. B-HEARD Data - Mayor's Office of Community Mental Health, accessed October 17, 2025, https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/bheard-data

  8. CASE STUDY: CAHOOTS - Vera Institute, accessed October 17, 2025, https://www.vera.org/behavioral-health-crisis-alternatives/cahoots

  9. Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) Program - City and County of Denver, accessed October 17, 2025, https://denvergov.org/Government/Agencies-Departments-Offices/Agencies-Departments-Offices-Directory/Public-Health-Environment/Community-Behavioral-Health/Behavioral-Health-Strategies/Support-Team-Assisted-Response-STAR-Program

  10. UMCR Council Update - LA City Clerk - City of Los Angeles, accessed October 17, 2025, https://cityclerk.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2020/20-0769-S7_rpt_cao_1_6-16-25.pdf

  11. Police Violence: Reducing the Harms of Policing Through Public Health–Informed Alternative Response Programs, accessed October 17, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9877383/

  12. NYC Public Advocate Responds to Report that Crime Rates Do Not Correlate to NYPD Headcount, accessed October 17, 2025, https://advocate.nyc.gov/press/nyc-public-advocate-responds-to-report-that-crime-rates-do-not-correlate-to-nypd-headcount

  13. Stop-and-Frisk Data - NYCLU, accessed October 17, 2025, https://www.nyclu.org/data/stop-and-frisk-data

  14. Audit of the Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division's Effectiveness in Responding to Individuals with Mental Health Crises and Meeting Its Goals - New York City Comptroller, accessed October 17, 2025, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-of-the-behavioral-health-emergency-assistance-response-divisions-effectiveness-in-responding-to-individuals-with-mental-health-crises-and-meeting-its-goals/

  15. Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division (B-HEARD) – New York, NY, accessed October 17, 2025, https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/expanding-first-response/program-highlights/newyork/

  16. National Survey of Mobile Crisis Teams - SAMHSA, accessed October 17, 2025, https://988crisissystemshelp.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/National%20Mobile%20Crisis%20Survey%20ReportvFINAL.pdf

  17. New Audit: Comptroller Finds Over a Third of Eligible Mental Health Calls Did Not Get a B-HEARD Team Response for Untracked Reasons, accessed October 17, 2025, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/new-audit-comptroller-finds-over-a-third-of-eligible-mental-health-calls-did-not-get-a-b-heard-team-response-for-untracked-reasons/

  18. Groundbreaking study shows benefits to reinventing responses for nonviolent 911 calls, accessed October 17, 2025, https://siepr.stanford.edu/news/groundbreaking-study-shows-benefits-reinventing-responses-nonviolent-911-calls

  19. Proven 'Crisis and Incident Response Through Community-led Engagement' Safety Program Expands Into Sherman Oaks | Mayor Karen Bass, accessed October 17, 2025, https://mayor.lacity.gov/news/proven-crisis-and-incident-response-through-community-led-engagement-safety-program-expands

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Policy Issues Series: The New York City Housing Crisis